By Riordan Roett
The 2006–07 period was important for Latin America in terms of elections. Most of the major countries—Brazil, Colombia, Mexico, Peru, Venezuela—and many we often think of as marginal—Bolivia, Ecuador and Nicaragua—held national elections. The results were dramatically different. In Brazil and Peru, voters reelected center-left candidates with relatively internationalist foreign policies. In particular, Brazilian President Luiz Inácio Lulu da Silva (“Lula”) has emerged as a pragmatic regional and global player. Brazil does not attempt to follow the lead of the United States in foreign policy matters, but its positions often complement those taken by Washington, D.C. Peru’s Alan Garcia also sees his country’s interests as aligned with traditional global trends.
Mexico and Colombia, on the other hand, elected astute conservatives. Felipe Calderón of the National Action Party in Mexico barely defeated a rabble-rousing opponent but quickly established his political savvy with a series of deft policy initiatives that have broken a logjam in the Mexican Congress. While Mexico’s foreign policy on regional and global issues is similar to that of the United States, there is at least one policy question that deeply separates the two neighbors: immigration. Alvaro Uribe, the reelected chief executive of Colombia, has long been viewed as the closest ally of the Bush White House. “Plan Colombia,” which has provided billions of dollars to Colombia for the war on drugs, quickly became part of the White House’s “war on terrorism.” Thus Colombia was seen as a key player in Latin America by the Bush administration.
The elections that drew a deep rift between the United States and the region were those in Venezuela, Bolivia and Ecuador. First elected in 1998, President Hugo Chávez of Venezuela has emerged as the most vociferous foreign policy opponent of the United States in the Western Hemisphere. Caracas disagrees with Washington, D.C., on everything from the “war on terrorism” to the support for market economics and international trade policy. Venezuela has been active in organizing an anti-U.S. bloc in Latin America, and the country’s foreign policy has been actively engaged in supporting anti-U.S. candidates abroad. Two of those strongly supported by Chávez were Evo Morales, the indigenous leader in Bolivia, and Rafael Correa in Ecuador.
For Chávez, the appearance of Evo Morales as an alternative political leader in Bolivia was an important opportunity to spread Venezuela’s influence in the Andean countries. Both leaders support anti-American views, and Morales moved quickly to nationalize the energy resources in his country that were held by foreign interests. Very much in line with Chávez’s rhetoric, Morales argued that the poor people of Bolivia, as in Venezuela, had been denied proper participation in national affairs and had not shared in the mineral and natural resource wealth of their respective countries. Morales was quickly categorized by the White House as a close ally of Chávez.
Rafael Correa came to power by building a heterogeneous coalition of indigenous and economically marginalized Ecuadorians. In Ecuador, as in Bolivia, the results of the presidential election were likely the death knell for the traditional political elites with whom the United States had worked closely and successfully for decades and who were firm supporters of U.S. foreign policy interests in the region. One of Correa’s priorities is to build new political institutions in Ecuador. He has threatened to default on the country’s international financial obligations, and he has made it clear that his foreign policy is not “Yankee”-driven but oriented by the thinking and actions of Chávez and Morales.
The reelection of Daniel Ortega in Nicaragua was a clear defeat for U.S. foreign policy. The U.S. Embassy in Managua had made it clear that Washington favored another candidate and that relations between the two countries would suffer if voters opted for a former guerrilla leader of the famous revolutionary movement in Nicaragua in the 1970s. Yet Nicaraguans took their chances and reelected the controversial Ortega. Chávez immediately signaled that he would provide massive financial assistance for the new government. In turn, it was clear that Ortega and his colleagues were now seen as supporters of the Chávez “Bolivarian Revolution” (so called for the 19th century “Liberator of South America,” Simón Bolívar).
Trade, Immigration Issues in U.S. Elections
The foreign policy debate in Latin America is now turning to the U.S. campaign and election in 2008. Will a new administration taking office in January 2009 deal differently with the diversity of foreign policies in the region, or will the new White House seek to restore traditional relations? The latter will be difficult. Even those governments that are viewed as skeptical of Chávez and his revolution have evolved over the last five or six years in terms of their view of their own role in world affairs and that of the United States.
While at the beginning of the George W. Bush administration there was some confidence that a sweeping Free Trade Area of the Americas (FTAA) would be negotiated, it has failed to materialize. Many countries argue that access to the U.S. market for their agricultural products is necessary before they yield on other trade issues with the United States. At the global level, the same sort of divide has taken place as the final round of the so-called Doha Round of trade talks at the World Trade Organization has stalled. A new coalition emerged in 2003 at a meeting in Cancun, Mexico, that has rallied the most important developing countries—led by Brazil and including China, India and South Africa—into an astute and successful alliance for the trade and investment interests of those countries.
Other important foreign policy issues for Latin America, such as immigration legislation in the United States and a hemisphere-wide policy on biofuels, are viewed with skepticism by leading candidates in both political parties. The realities of American politics have changed sharply since the election of Bush in 2000. The “winners and losers” argument in the trade sphere has stressed the losers argument with regard to American workers, arguing that their jobs are being exported overseas to lower-wage countries. In negotiations over bilateral trade agreements with Colombia, Panama and Peru, Democrats and Republicans in Congress have called for strong labor and environmental standards to protect workers at home and in those countries with which the United States has trade relations. Pressure for subsidies to protect American farmers remains strong and is a major obstacle to finalizing pending trade agreements at the regional and global levels. Regardless of who wins the presidential election in 2008, trade will remain a contentious and emotional issue for the White House.
The second policy question that increasingly concerns Latin America is the lack of will in Washington to approve a comprehensive immigration reform bill. The issue of immigration has become highly emotional and controversial in the United States over the last decade; in fact, much of 2007 was taken with bitter debates across the country and in Congress. In late June, the Democratic leader in the Senate, Harry Reid, withdrew pending legislation, with insufficient votes to pass the bill.
Those in favor of new immigration legislation argue that immigrants are an economic necessity and a political reality. The private sector generally agrees that immigrant labor, particularly in small and medium-sized enterprises, is critical. The position that the United States can ignore or punish undocumented workers is viewed by those in favor of reform as both unrealistic and often racist. Opponents to new immigration legislation argue that the United States is under siege and needs to secure its borders, both as part of the “war on terrorism” and as a practical policy to protect the U.S. workforce.
It is clear the two sides are irreconcilable. The immigration question is particularly relevant in Mexico and the countries of Central America and the Caribbean, which are the source of the vast majority of illegal workers. There is no question that the next president will once again need to seek a compromise in Congress on an issue that has become a lightning rod for both political parties and their supporters across the country.
U.S.-Latin America Biofuel Debate
A third issue that is quickly becoming part of the foreign policy debate in both the United States and Latin America is that of biofuels. Given U.S. dependence on imported petroleum—and taking into account that the hostile regime of Chávez is a major supplier of oil to the American market—there has been an active search for alternative sources of energy. The issue of biofuels—energy produced from agricultural products—has thus captured the imagination of policymakers in the region.
The main example in the region is Brazil, which produces ethanol from sugarcane and has abundant land available and a great deal of experience with ethanol technology. The United States and Brazil signed an agreement in March to share technology and promote ethanol production. However, a major obstacle remains: American ethanol is produced from corn, and U.S. growers are protected by a 54-cent tariff on imported Brazilian ethanol.
Chávez has argued against ethanol production because it uses valuable land that he contends should produce crops for the region’s poor. He also claims the rapid transfer of land from crops to sugarcane will raise food prices. The different views on ethanol have led to an estrangement between Brazil and Venezuela. The ethanol issue has also brought support from those concerned about global climate change. A shift from gasoline-driven vehicles to those that use ethanol will reduce carbon pollution over time. Will the U.S. Congress be willing to revisit the issue of agricultural subsidies for corn in the coming years in order to move ahead on the agreement with Brazil? Will the major car manufacturers see this as an opportunity or a threat to production plans over the next decade?
Given the wide variety of political regimes in Latin America today, it will be difficult for the next American administration either to return to past foreign policies or to design one policy that fits all. There will be a need for nuance and understanding of the differences that have emerged in the region. That will require compromise, both between Washington and Latin America and within the U.S. Congress.
Washington’s record of the last few years is not favorable to new, pragmatic initiatives. But if the United States hopes to neutralize the foreign policies of the governments of Hugo Chávez and his allies, it will need to seek common ground with the centrist presidents in Mexico and Brazil as well as with their friends in order to identify a new set of priorities for the 21st century.
Riordan Roett is the Sarita and Don Johnston Professor and director of Western Hemisphere Studies.
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