Is Hu a Conservative Authoritarian or a Pragmatic Reformer?
By Carla Freeman

Ruling China is an awesome task. China’s emperors knew from history that the stability of the vast and complex civilization they ruled could be disrupted and, when it was, the costs to Chinese society would be high. “Chaos under heaven” could come from beyond China’s borders, or it could come from within if a weak dynasty proved unable to preserve social order in the face of social, political and even moral challenges.

China’s current leadership is acutely aware that it governs China at a time when the astounding growth that has made the nation a global heavyweight and promises even greater power and prosperity in the future is also bringing staggering social, environmental and institutional challenges. And the country’s economic growth must be sustained.

At the same time, China’s political elite has come to power yet one more political generation removed from the revolution that put the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) in charge in Beijing, and when the public image of the party is tarnished by its association with official corruption and other abuses. China’s party leadership knows it has work to do to assure the party’s future at China’s helm.

Hu’s in Control
Four years after Jiang Zemin stepped down as chairman of the CCP, China’s so-called “Fourth Generation” leadership appears firmly ensconced in the antimacassared chairs of Zhongnanhai.

Hu Jintao, the newest man at thetop of China’s party, state and, since 2004, military hierarchies, was just six years old when the People’s Republic was founded. Handpicked by Deng Xiaoping as Jiang Zemin’s possible successor when only in his forties, Hu projects confidence if not charisma. For all Hu’s Qinghua University credentials, China’s top leader, who like China’s high-profile premier, Wen Jiabao, spent much of his career in some of China’s poorest regions, appears comfortable interacting with China’s man on the street—or peasant in the field. During the SARS epidemic, Hu personally visited hospitals and affected regions. This populist political style, propagandized as the “three closenesses” (sange tiejin)—close to reality, close to the people and close to life—contrasts with Jiang’s more remote approach to leadership. Although Hu’s career began to take him overseas beginning only in the mid-1990s, and then seldom to the West, he appears at ease abroad—even faced with bungled protocol on the White House lawn as he was last April. At the same time, Hu has proven adept at extending his personal political influence, building support within China’s military, and defying experts’ auguries that the beneficiaries of Jiang Zemin’s patronage still in the Politburo would test the limits of his authority.

If next fall’s 17th Party Congress follows the pattern of its post-Mao Zedong predecessors, Hu will use it to further consolidate his own political control and set the coordinates for future party work. The congress will result in a political report reflecting the top leadership’s consensus assessment of the party’s latest achievements and its policy objectives for the next five-year period. Party Congresses also offer a chance to change the composition of China’s top leadership bodies, and Hu can be expected to exert strong influence over the selection process. Among the most anticipated outcomes of the 17th Party Congress is the likely designation of Hu’s successor as party chief after the 2012 Party Congress.

‘CCP Wan Sui’
Whatever the ultimate substance of the outcomes associated with the Party Congress next year, all will connect to Hu’s overarching preoccupation as party chief: to strengthen the CCP’s capacity to “[build] a socialist society with Chinese characteristics,” as he declared in a recent Politburo speech. Under Hu’s leadership, to date this has included an emphasis on demonstrating the party’s “vanguard character” through party leadership in “building a harmonious society” and “scientific development,” goals that encompass redressing the social and environmental problems associated with China’s economic reforms through improvements in social equity as well as more sustainable and balanced growth. Other party emphases include promoting “peaceful development” in China’s external relations, including with Taiwan; improving the quality and efficiency of public administration and the rule of law; and curbing corruption. The next Party Congress is likely to sustain these priorities, with emphasis on rural development.

What about political reform? The fairly freewheeling discussions on political reform at the Central Party School during Hu’s tenure there had seemed to predispose him to tolerate public debate on the topic, and there was widespread speculation that he could preside over significant political liberalization in China. In the first months after Hu’s succession, however, the party abruptly closed the floodgates on the effluence of public discussion on constitutional protections for civil rights. It also launched a “Campaign to Maintain the Advanced Nature of the Party.” The campaign has been associated with attacks by Hu on the spread of “bourgeois liberalization” (a phrase associated with conservative opposition to political reform during the mid-1980s) and criticism of proposals for political reform as threats to stability. Reportedly, many party members initially gave this old-style rectification campaign a captious reception; however, it may serve Hu to gauge party members’ discipline—and perhaps to test their loyalty.

And there is the case of the Qiu He promotion. According to analysis in the China Leadership Monitor, this county party secretary was “helicoptered” to Jiangsu’s vice governorship, suggesting central support for what was by all accounts Qiu’s autocratic, results-oriented approach to improving public order and local economic conditions.

What seemed following the SARS crisis an ineluctable movement toward more open and dynamic media and a greater role for civil society organizations in China also has seen setbacks. Hu has declared support for “social and public welfare undertakings … which have a direct relationship with people’s health and life quality.” However, in the past two years NGOs across sectors have faced new constraints on their operations.

There are also new restrictions on the media, among them an expanded Internet police force and rules limiting access to campus chat rooms. Editors at Freezing Point, the China Youth Daily’s influential weekly with a track record of tackling politically sensitive issues, have been disciplined. Recently introduced regulations give the government’s Xinhua News control over distribution within China of news and information from foreign agencies—a commercial move by Xinhua against foreign competitors perhaps, but the regulations as they stand facilitate stricter censorship. As a Xinhua spokesman put it while defending the move, “When you enter a village, abide by its customs. When you visit a country, learn its taboos.”

Local governments also may be granted the legal right to manage information about local emergencies, including the capacity to fine local media for reporting on them. If this occurs it will mark a sharp break with the post-SARS talk by central leaders about the public’s “right to know” (zhiqingquan). This apparent trend toward harsher treatment of the media has been connected to remarks reportedly made by Hu at the 2004 Fourth Plenary Session of the 16th CCP Central Committee in which he linked some streams of public opinion to attacks by “enemy forces” with an agenda of the “Westernization” of China’s political system. Hu’s direct reference to the collapse of the Soviet Union in that speech made it clear that a Chinese-style glasnost is unlikely. The strong preference for now seems to be to keep discussions about political reform an internal party affair.

Five Lakes, Four Seas—or Both?
These developments and others raise questions about what kind of leader Hu really is—an ideologically conservative authoritarian at heart who, as some have postulated, has turned to old CCP playbooks in the face of the threats to social stability associated with the reforms? Or a pragmatic tactician with a fundamentally reformist agenda? (After all, Jiang, who presided over some of the country’s most dramatic reforms—from WTO accession to changes to the criteria for party membership to allow business entrepreneurs into the fold—was initially labeled a hardliner.) 

Whom Hu chooses to lead with him for the next five years will offer insights into his political vision. He will guide the selection of leaders to fill a number of slots on both the Politburo and its standing committee when several current members reach or approach 70, the designated retirement age for leaders in these elite posts. Many such leaders are associated with Jiang’s so-called “Shanghai gang.”

Even as China’s vice president, Hu began using his influence to elevate cadres with Communist Youth League backgrounds to regional party and government positions. Another slew of promotions made by Hu in the last several years, however, have also come from the ranks of the so-called “princelings”—those with close family ties to party elders. Both groups joined the political elite amid China’s most rapid period of economic liberalization after the Cultural Revolution, nearly all have college degrees, a number have studied abroad and about half of those born after 1950 have professional credentials associated with the market economy.

There are significant personal and professional differences between the Youth League and princeling groups, however. Many from the Youth League have family ties to China’s inland and less-developed provinces; they have extensive work experience in rural areas and in party organization and discipline, propaganda and mobilization work. Many participated in the Cultural Revolution. Political scientist Cheng Li observes that, of 22 prominent members of this group, none had worked in foreign trade, international investment finance or banking. The princelings, in contrast, came of age politically connected and have held top posts in some of China’s most dynamic and internationally open economic regions.

These differences are reflected in the two groups’ divergent political approaches. The Youth League group has been connected to this year’s “Eight Honors and Eight Disgraces” campaign. Official Chinese media describe this campaign as a “new concept of socialist morality” associated with the party’s aggressive anti-corruption efforts—which notably have included a number of high-profile corruption cases involving senior leaders in Shanghai, among them Shanghai Communist Party chief Chen Liangyu, arrested in late September. Princelings like the current party secretary of Zhejiang, Xi Jinping, are more often linked to efforts to combat corruption through institutional changes. Xi holds a law degree from Qinghua.

Indications are that with the 17th Party Congress both these “seas” and “lakes” will rise. According to veteran analyst Willy Lam, promotions will include leaders like Liaoning Party Secretary Li Keqiang. Li’s biography includes manual labor in Anhui during the Cultural Revolution, law and economics study at Beijing University, positions on the Communist Youth League’s Central Committee and serving as deputy party secretary of Henan. Princeling Xi Jinping, mentioned above, is likely to move into the senior political ranks as well. Recent developments also point to the possible elevation to the Politburo Standing Committee of Wang Zhaoguo, the current president of the -government-run All-China Federation of Trade Unions, who recently ran a winning campaign to force Wal-Mart to unionize its stores in China. (At a time when CCP-KMT party-to-party ties seem at a critical point, Wang, who served as director of the State Council’s Taiwan Affairs Office, also could become chairman of the united front Chinese People’s Political Consultative Congress.)

Other expected promotions to the Central Committee include Zhang -Qingli, Yang Chuantang and Li -Yuanchao, party secretaries of Tibet, Shandong and Jiangsu, respectively. Zhang and Yang are close associates of Hu; both share Hu’s experience in Tibet. Neither has much formal higher education. Li, on the other hand, holds a doctorate in law from the Central Party School and degrees in math and economics from Fudan and Beijing universities, completed a leadership training program at Harvard University and has professional experience in Shanghai.

Tomorrow’s Party Leadership
A leadership with this mixed pedigree would give Hu considerable political range of motion. It would include the children of party elders who hold their own tremendous political resources. It would broaden the scope of professional expertise among the top party leadership to include lawyers and economists—an engineering background is more typical of the current party elite. It would also elevate leaders trained in party organization who have grassroots experience. In aggregate, Hu’s senior party leadership would have background relevant to China’s continuing progress toward the liberalization of its economy and related redesign of its state institutions, but also to sustaining a Leninist Party structure.

What about Hu’s political successor? Many analysts believe that Hu intends to choose Li Keqiang for his résumé in party organization over politically connected Xi Jinping. This would suggest that Hu’s is a fundamentally conservative vision for China’s political future, one that continues to see China prone to disintegration like a sheet of loose sand in the absence of strong political leadership. At the same time, elevated from among his peers, Li Keqiang would also be first among equals in a party leadership that represents a breadth of experience relevant to China’s continuing development of the legal and institutional instruments needed to address its current social and economic challenges, given a sustained commitment to continued economic liberalization and participation in the world economy. It’s a CCP that will champion workers’ rights in the face of the global corporate giants like Wal-Mart that the party has welcomed in the door, but that also reserves the authority to silence dissent seen as harmful to China’s national interests—as it has defined them.

For now Hu seems committed to securing the party’s legitimacy and role as supreme arbiter of the relationship between state and society by virtue of its capacity to deliver prosperity and social justice to the people. If this is the case, Hu’s vision for China’s political future is one in which a still powerful party leads the country with a sort of “responsive totalism”—to play off the conceptualization of the late political scientist Tang Tsou, not the political pluralism we in the West associate with market economies.

Carla Freeman is associate director of the China Studies Program and a professorial lecturer. She received  her M.A. and Ph.D. from SAIS