By David G. Brown
Today, a “rising China” has burst into the world’s consciousness. As SAIS Professor David M. Lampton notes, this reemergence has forced people to adjust a century-long image of a weak country and come to terms with a China that has economic power and growing international influence. China’s new strengths have contributed to an increasing nationalism that is already affecting leadership decisions.
Across the Taiwan Strait, the people of Taiwan have gone through a transformation of a different kind over the past two decades. For 40 years, the Kuomintang (KMT) governments led by Chiang Kai-shek and later Chiang Ching-kuo tried to force-feed the post-Japanese colonial Taiwanese majority the idea that they were Chinese, committed to the goal of reconquering, or later reuniting with, the mainland. Language policy, educational curricula, public buildings, holidays and even street names were used to inculcate a Chinese national consciousness in the population. In the late 1980s, Taiwan’s democratic revolution unleashed pent-up local emotions, and since then Taiwanese have been debating and searching for Taiwan’s unique identity or consciousness. Ethnic and National Identity
In trying to understand the complex phenomenon of Taiwanese identity, Taiwanese analysts have differentiated between a person’s ethnic or cultural identity and his or her sense of a national identity. The old divide in Taiwanese society was between the “Taiwanese” majority (85 percent) who were living on the island before 1945 and the “mainlanders” who came from provinces on the mainland and followed Chiang Kai-shek’s KMT government to Taiwan in 1949. A half-century of intermarriage and two generations of young people growing up together on the island have blurred those differences, though evidence of them frequently is seen in the heat of political campaigns. A long series of independent opinion polling has shown that the number of people on Taiwan who identity themselves as exclusively Chinese has declined from 48 percent in 1993 to about 6 percent in 2006. In recent years, about 90 percent of the public has professed some form of Taiwanese identity. Within this overwhelming majority, there are two competing ways to think of one’s Taiwanese identity. The important distinction is between those who think of themselves culturally as exclusively Taiwanese and those who see themselves as both Taiwanese and Chinese. While the “exclusively Taiwanese” segment was growing in the 1990s, in recent years, those who claim a Taiwanese identity have divided about equally, with around 40 percent considering themselves exclusively Taiwanese and around 40 percent as both Taiwanese and Chinese. If the Taiwanese have ancestors who came from China and speak Chinese, what is the basis for a separate Taiwanese identity that rejects Chinese-ness? Proponents of a unique Taiwanese identity see Taiwan as a heterogeneous society formed from many different sources, including indigenous people, Chinese immigrants, Dutch colonial influences in the 17th century and Japanese colonial influences in the 20th century—a society shaped by a shared historical struggle by Taiwanese against foreign occupiers. The most thoroughgoing Taiwanese nationalists view the Chiang Kai-shek government as only the most recent of these “alien occupiers.” Separate from cultural identity is the concept of national identity. Here the distinction is between those who want Taiwan to be permanently and legally separate from China and those who envisage Taiwan’s future involving some form of association or reunification with China. Attitudes about Taiwan’s future have not changed much over the 15 years of polling data. A large majority (more than 60 percent) favors the status quo, which can be described as de facto autonomy. About 10 percent envisage the possibility of eventual reunification, and 15 to 20 percent want de jure independence. The large majorities for the status quo reflect a pragmatic tendency among the Taiwan public—an awareness of two unwelcome external realities: first, the reality of a nearby powerful China that threatens to use force to prevent independence and, second, that the American, Japanese and other powers do not support -independence for Taiwan. In fact, more detailed polling indicates that about a quarter of the public is quite -open-minded about the future and, in certain ideal circumstances that do not exist currently, could accept either a peacefully achieved independence or reunification with a truly democratic China. No predictable causal link exists between a person’s ethnic and national identities. Nevertheless, it is not surprising that the small minority that see themselves as exclusively Chinese culturally are those that are most likely to support eventual reunification with China. Those who see themselves as exclusively Taiwanese are somewhat more likely to support independence, but the majority of them, like those who consider themselves both Chinese and Taiwanese, support the status quo. Politics of Identity
What is driving the growth of a distinctive Taiwanese identity? In part, this is a natural bottom-up phenomenon among the Taiwanese people. The island has governed itself since 1949, has accomplished a record of rapid economic and social progress and has achieved a peaceful transition to democracy. Taiwanese have much to be proud of, and they long for their accomplishments to be recognized internationally. After the Chiang government’s efforts to impose a Chinese consciousness eased, there was a natural rebirth of interest in Taiwan’s history, society and culture. However, the growth of a Taiwanese identity also has been promoted by a purposeful top-down process led by politicians who want to create conditions favoring legal independence for Taiwan. Beginning in the mid-1990s, then President Lee Teng-hui began promoting a Taiwanese identity by talking of Taiwan as a separate society, describing the old Chiang government as an alien regime and changing public school textbooks to emphasize Taiwanese history and society. As an ex-president, Lee Teng-hui has become an ardent advocate of independence. President Chen Shui-bian has made the promotion of a separate Taiwanese identity a hallmark of his presidency. His purpose has been both to create conditions that favor eventual independence and to broaden the base of support for his Democratic Progressive Party (DPP). This top-down exploitation of the national identity issue has exacerbated the difference over identity. In his 2004 reelection campaign, Chen Shui-bian sought to rally his pro-independence base by stating that his mission in a second term would be to write a new constitution that would make Taiwan a “normal” democratic country. This was an explicit Taiwanese nationalist agenda. Chen highlighted evidence of Beijing’s hostility toward Taiwan and then tried to tar his opponents as people who loved China, not Taiwan. The 2004 campaign and Chen’s close and contested victory bitterly polarized Taiwan politics around the issue of national identity. These leaders’ promotion of a separate Taiwanese national identity has been helped by Beijing’s policy response to Taiwan’s democratic transformation. In the weeks leading up to Taiwan’s first direct presidential election, held in 1996, Beijing conducted a series of provocative military exercises and missile tests that were intended to intimidate Taiwan into rejecting leaders who would promote independence. The effort failed. Since then, advocates of Taiwanese nationalism have used those threatening actions and Beijing’s steady deployment of short-range missiles opposite Taiwan to portray China as hostile toward Taiwan. In 2003, during the SARS epidemic, Beijing tried to prevent the World Health Organization (WHO) from assisting Taiwan with its SARS outbreak. At one point, Beijing’s representative to WHO was caught on camera asking, “Who cares about Taiwan?” Beijing’s attitude and that incident were used effectively by Taiwanese nationalists to promote their version of an exclusively Taiwanese consciousness. In short, Beijing’s policies have helped fuel the growth of a separate Taiwanese identity. Taiwanese Nationalism?
Chen and his DPP supporters now assert that a strong “Taiwan-centric identity” (Taiwan Zhuti Rentong) has formed on Taiwan and that this new reality needs to be taken into account by Beijing and the rest of the world. They cite their own polls to argue that a 60 percent majority now supports this new Taiwan-centric identity. Their vague terminology (rather than the term “Taiwanese nationalism”) is designed to make their assertion of a strong Taiwanese identity less provocative and thus more acceptable. The terminology also seems to be a recognition of reality. The reality is that a sense of Taiwanese consciousness has grown in recent years, but that this consciousness has not yet become a majority Taiwanese nationalist movement. Taiwanese nationalism requires a strong view of the Taiwanese as a distinct cultural group separate from China combined with support for a political program to make Taiwan a de jure independent state. Only a minority supports this Taiwanese nationalism at the present time. The divided sense of cultural identity among Taiwanese and the pragmatic approach the majority of Taiwanese take toward relations with the mainland have limited the growth of an overt Taiwanese nationalism at both the leadership and popular levels. In addition, the strong and growing economic ties between Taiwan and the mainland work as a counterweight to Taiwanese nationalism. Last year, 70 percent of Taiwan’s outward direct investment went to the mainland, and approximately 750,000 Taiwanese, mainly businesspersons, were long-term residents on the mainland—a number equivalent to about 7 percent of Taiwan’s labor force. Nevertheless, the development of this stronger Taiwanese consciousness is a challenge for Beijing, representing a powerful impediment to Beijing’s efforts to win Taiwan’s agreement to eventual reunification. If allowed to grow, this rising Taiwanese consciousness could develop into a true nationalist movement, which would be a direct challenge to China’s national goal of reunification for Taiwan. In 2004, Chinese leaders seemed finally to realize that their policies toward Taiwan were contributing to attitudes that were fundamentally dangerous to China’s own interests. The focus of Chinese policy noticeably shifted from promoting unification to preventing Taiwanese independence. Under President Hu Jintao, Beijing has begun to add “carrots” to its policy toward Taiwan and to make the “sticks” in its policy somewhat less prominent. Promoting closer cross-strait economic and cultural ties has become a higher priority. Those ties are substantial, and Beijing sees their promotion as a way to weaken Taiwanese consciousness. Beijing has taken a number of unilateral steps to benefit Taiwanese farmers, businessmen and students. Beijing also has found indirect ways of negotiating new agreements to develop cross-strait air service and soon to encourage Chinese tourism to Taiwan. In 2005, Taiwanese opposition party leaders found it politically possible to visit Beijing, and their visits have opened the door for active exchanges and even a degree of cooperation between Beijing and the KMT. The sticks in Chinese policy have not changed. The People’s Liberation Army modernization program continues to receive strong leadership support and remains focused on Taiwan contingencies. However, Beijing has downplayed direct military provocations toward Taiwan. And China’s policy of blocking Taiwan’s participation in international organizations and even some international NGOs has not changed and continues to provide ammunition for Taiwanese nationalists. How Taiwanese identity will develop in the future remains an open question. External factors including Chinese opposition, the lack of international support and growing cross-strait economic and cultural ties are likely to continue checking the development of Taiwanese nationalism. However, it is also likely that a distinctive Taiwanese identity will continue to strengthen because of perceptions of hostile PRC policies and the continuing domestic debate. A strong Taiwanese consciousness will impede China’s long-term goal of unification and set limits on what any Taiwanese leader will be able to accept in terms of compromises with China. These trends also have important implications for the United States. For over three decades, U.S. policy has encouraged a peaceful resolution of cross-strait differences. The Taiwan Relations Act, passed by Congress in 1979, expresses the strong American interest in Taiwan’s security. As a clash of Taiwanese and Chinese nationalisms in the strait would create real challenges for American policy, Washington has sought to minimize such prospects by making clear both that the United States does not support independence for Taiwan and that this country would oppose Beijing’s use of force against Taiwan. David G. Brown is a professorial lecturer of China Studies. | 
